Shots at the border

There was a border incident down in Nagorno-Karabakh yesterday.

Armenia says the Azeris made a small-scale attack, and that 8 Azeris and 1 Armenian were killed.  Azerbaijan says the Armenians made the attack, and that 8 Azeris and 16 Armenians were killed.

Armenia says Azerbaijan made a probing attack in the hope of taking advantage of Armenia's internal distraction.  Azerbaijan says the Armenians staged an incident to distract Armenian public opinion and unite the country against a foreign foe.

Today Armenia's Defense Minister said that the situation in Nagorno had returned to normal.

(In Yerevan?  I'd say 95% back to normal.  Armed soldiers at key intersections, but all the stores are open, the mess from the weekend is totally cleaned up, traffic and business are flowing as usual.)

Comments

[Paul]

Both explanations are possible- maybe a bit of both though that'd require some sort of coordination. I don't know what to make of the incident or who is really at fault. It is interesting that they coincided with one of Aliyev's (admittedly many) firey speeches about being ready to take back Karabakh by force. A small victory at the same time for the Azeris would do a lot to show they mean business. It seems like they only temporarily took the land though- Armenia says they regained the positions and the Azeri press says nothing about any loss or gain so I doubt this was actually a success for them. The conflicting death tolls might be a way for making up for that, Azeri spinners are declaring victory saying that killing 15 Armenians shows they are ready and capable of taking back Karabakh- which makes me think the truth of the death toll is likely closer to what Armenia says but it's impossible to know.

[Noel Maurer]

Dude, my web browser brings up the comments list a few seconds before the main body of the blog. So when I saw that somebody had replied to a post titled "Shots at the border," I thought it was going to be Carlos talking about drinking tequila in El Paso.

Then I read it, and it was about shots at the border. Entirely inappropriately, I laughed.

I like your sense of humor, Doug.

[Andrew Lambdin-Abraham]

Should we take it as a given that 8 Azeris were killed given they agree on that?

[Jussi Jalonen]

The discrepancy in the reported Armenian fatalities could be easily explained. Militiamen don't always show up on official lists, so it's probably one regular Armenian soldier dead, accompanied by fifteen irregular fellows with guns.

... and meanwhile, South Ossetia has declared independence (again). What was that comment about how the situation "could potentially be settled" and how "they'll switch sides easily enough" that you made back in November, Doug?

Next week, the Duma will say its piece. And I'm sort of expecting that McCain would also say something; in fact, at the moment, he seems to be the _only_ American person of significance who actually could be expected to say something of the issue.

Cheers,

J. J.

[Doug M.]

Jussi, that's... kind of annoying. I know your English is good enough to grasp the adverb "potentially".

Here's the whole statement:

"The Ossetians mistrust the Georgians, but don't hate them; they like the Russians tolerably well, but the petition for incorporation is for mutual convenience, not because they think it's the only way they can survive.

"There's a farcical element to the South Ossetia dispute. Frex, several hundred Ossetians were lured over to the Georgian side this year by a program that gave them heavily subsidized vacations on the Black Sea. Wossname, the leader of the South Ossetian state, made a long speech more or less anathematizing them.

"That's why I think it could potentially be settled... if the Georgians make the Ossetians an offer that's good enough (and believable), they'll switch sides easily enough. It's not a conflict written in blood.

"This is very different from Abkhazia, where passions run much higher and the bitterness goes deep. Abkhazia is not going back under Georgian rule, no matter how good the offer looks."

See that if-clause there? "If it rains, the ground will get wet." I suspect there's something similar in Finnish.

And it still reads good to me. Abkhazia will never go back to Georgia; South Ossetia might. It would require all three sides, especially Georgia, to be reasonable. And sweet reason is not one of the Caucasus' major exports. But it's still entirely possible.

It's also possible that South Ossetia might leave Georgia for good and join with Russia, of course. Have I ever ruled that out?

In any event, I'm taking the long view. The frozen conflicts are all 15+ years old; none of them will be solved tomorrow, and I'll be very surprised if any of them resolve this year. So, a declaration this way or that doesn't much signify.

If I had to point to an indicator, I'd note that the treatment of other non-Georgian minorities in Georgia -- especially Armenians and Azeris -- hasn't budged. To make a really convincing offer to the South Ossetians, it would help if the Georgians could say, "look! see how the Armenians have their own schools, and can use their language in the courts, and such!"

Unfortunately, that goes against the whole ethnic-nationalist hardwiring of the current President and his inner circle. In fact, the trend is the opposite -- low-grade pressure on the Armenians and Azeris to either integrate thoroughly or get out. So, not so good at the moment.

On the other hand, the Georgians have already made some significant concessions -- cf. Sanakoev's speech to Parliament in Ossetian, through a translator. And they've made some headway. Depending on who you talk to, Sanakoev has the loyalty of something betweeen "a few villages" and "25%" of South Ossetia". Whatever the truth is -- and I suspect it changes from month to month, as allegiances shift -- it's clear that thousands of South Ossetians are already under nominal Georgian rule, and not minding it too much.

Doug M.

[Noel Maurer]

Is there a map of the de facto boundaries in the region anywhere?

ObQuestion: is the post-1945 norm of "no forcible boundary changes will be recognized" preventing conflict in the Caucasus or encouraging it?

[Jussi Jalonen]

The catch is precisely that at the moment, the said "potential" is disappearing. The possibility that you named seemed like speculating on the unlikely already back then, and today, even more so.

And the declaration in itself may not signify much - you'll note that I included a mention that this is nothing new in the parenthesis - but the fact is that the situation is now also directly linked to international developments.

At the end of the day, internal factors in the Caucasus itself are secondary, because the Russian attitude trumps everything. And if the Kremlin wants confrontation - even as a test-ball to the United States and the NATO - there'll be confrontation.

And right now, given the events in Kosovo and the political transition period in the United States, pitching a test-ball seems an extremely attractive move.

Myself, I'm already taking bets on Finland extending formal recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia before recognizing Kosovo. Two reasons: 1) the increasing wariness of the president towards Russia, and 2) the traditional inferiority complex of the president towards her predecessor.

Cheers,

J. J.